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464 Faith and Philosophy
Darwinism and its Discontents, by Michael Ruse. Cambridge University 
Press, 2006. 290 pages + references + index. Cloth $30.00.
ANGUS MENUGE, Concordia University Wisconsin
In an earlier work—Can a Darwinian be a Christian?—Ruse argued that 
someone fully committed to Darwinism could consistently embrace much 
of the Christian faith. While Ruse expected a mixed response, he was sur-
prised that some agreed with his thesis but could not see “how any right-
thinking person could be a Darwinian” (p. ix). Ruse presents the current 
volume as a “prequel” to the earlier work, giving the strongest possible 
reasons to embrace a thoroughgoing Darwinism. By “thoroughgoing,” I 
mean that Ruse, like Daniel Dennett, is a reductionist philosopher who 
believes that the Darwinian perspective is a universal acid, transforming 
our understanding of everything. Yet Ruse is markedly more generous to 
dissenters than some other Darwinists. Although he claims that “All of the 
critics of Darwinism are deeply mistaken” (p. 4), Ruse takes pains to con-
sider and reply to their objections, making reasonable concessions along 
the way. For this reason—and also because of his encyclopedic grasp of 
the history of the origins debate—Ruse is, for my money, a more effective 
apologist for Darwinism than either Dennett or Richard Dawkins.
Ruse begins (chap. 1) by arguing that Darwin truly is a significant fig-
ure responsible for a major scientific revolution. This claim is disputed 
by historians of science, both because there were other significant evolu-
tionists (such as Denis Diderot and Darwin’s Grandfather Erasmus), and 
because Darwin’s main contribution—the idea of natural selection—was 
resoundingly rejected by most of his contemporaries. Ruse points out 
that Darwin’s claim to fame rests on three main achievements. First, he 
discovered some very important evidences for evolution, including the 
marked differences between island and continental species, and the ability 
of animal and plant breeders to produce new forms of crops and livestock. 
Secondly, he applied William Whewell’s idea of “consilience” to these and 
a large range of other facts, including similarities between the structure 
and embryos of different creatures, arguing they all point to descent with 
modification from common ancestors. Lastly, inspired by Malthus’s ob-
servations about the “struggle for existence,” he proposed a mechanism—
natural selection—that removed final causes from biology.
Ruse concedes that most people who embraced evolution did not ac-
cept natural selection, because they were wedded to an idea of progress 
that implies a direction to the unfolding of life: “most people did not want 
to see evolution as . . . a straight scientific theory. . . . They were far more 
interested in exploiting its potential as a kind of alternative to religion” 
(p. 18). Darwin failed to found “a professionally based area of biological 
science” (p. 24), yet, Ruse argues, Darwin’s revolution was merely delayed 
until its synthesis with modern population genetics in the 1930s, often 
called “neo-Darwinism.”
Biographical credits over, Ruse gets down to the serious business of 
defending neo-Darwinism. He first argues for the fact of evolution (chap. 
2), by which he means that “organisms came from other forms . . . by a 
process or processes that are entirely natural, that is to say, governed 
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by and only by unguided regularities or laws” p. (25). Alas, right here, 
and also in his discussion of methodological naturalism (pp. 47–51), 
Ruse unhelpfully identifies naturalism with materialism and supposes 
that the only alternative to unguided laws (materialism) is intervention-
ist supernaturalism (miracles), and therefore that Intelligent Design is a 
misguided science of the supernatural. Of course almost everyone agrees 
that invoking miracles has limited or no value in science proper. But 
the alternative to “unguided regularities or laws” need not be miracles. 
Nature itself may contain goal-directed processes—precisely Aristotle’s 
view of embryogenesis. And even a theist who believes in intelligent de-
sign can maintain that the designer normally works through the means 
of physical processes.
To see the problem, consider a carpet with an exquisite pattern. If some-
one infers intelligent design, he is not refuted by the discovery that the 
carpet derived from an automatic Jacquard loom employing a mindless 
punched card instead of an intelligent human operator. He can note that 
the carpet reflects the design of the highly improbable pattern (specifica-
tion) contained in the card, with the intelligent designers lying further 
back. The fact that the loom operated naturally (no miracles are required 
to explain the carpet) is perfectly consistent with its products being the 
results of intelligent guidance. Likewise, the fact that natural laws seem 
in themselves unguided won’t show that they are. They may result in 
complex intelligent life only because of the fine-tuning of the fundamental 
laws and constants of physics. Since design can be inferred without invok-
ing miracles (as it is by fine-tuning arguments), Ruse is mistaken to con-
trast unguided laws with supernatural intervention and makes Intelligent 
Design a weaker opponent than it needs to be.
Leaving aside methodology, what about the facts? Ruse points out (p. 
28) that dog breeders have shown a remarkable degree of morphological 
plasticity within Canis familiaris (the domesticated dog). Ruse concedes 
that no new species is produced—“All dogs are interfertile” (p. 32). Actu-
ally, the example is even less impressive, because all breeding actually 
does is shuffle existing genes so that previously recessive genes are now 
expressed—it does not generate novel genetic information. Although there 
is good indirect evidence of speciation, the observable examples of evo-
lution, such as the resistance of bacteria to antibiotics, only demonstrate 
microevolution (variation within species), not transitions between higher 
biological kinds (macroevolution). Of course, no-one is able to observe 
“change of the reptile-into-bird, hippopotamus-into-whale, monkey-into-
human kind” (p. 33). But although indirect, Ruse argues that the case is 
still strong as an “inference to the best explanation” (p. 37).
There are methodological and factual worries about this claim. Meth-
odologically, inference to the best explanation is competitive and is only 
compelling if all reasonable explanations are considered, but because he 
mischaracterizes it, Ruse does not seriously consider Intelligent Design 
as competition. Then there are the facts. Ruse cites the fossil record (fur-
ther discussed in chap. 4) and notes the apparent progression from lower 
kinds like amphibians to higher kinds like mammals and humans, and the 
evidence for transitions such as the apparent stages of horse evolution. 
However, at the level of phyla, which distinguish organisms in terms of 
466 Faith and Philosophy
fundamental body plan, there are two major problems. First, most of the 
phyla of living animals appear abruptly in the Cambrian explosion, not 
gradually as Darwinism predicts. Secondly, while there are some plausi-
ble examples of transitions among lower biological kinds, they are absent 
at the higher levels. As Wells and Dembski point out, this is a problem for 
the Darwinian view, because “for every link connecting minor divisions 
there should be hundreds connecting major divisions.”1
Ruse also appeals to homologies (similar structures in different crea-
tures) as evidence of common ancestry, but later admits that “There are 
repeated examples of convergence, of organisms of very different back-
grounds and ancestries nevertheless finding their way into almost iden-
tical niches . . . with almost identical adaptations” (p. 201). Evidently, 
structural similarity does not by itself show common ancestry. He notes 
similarities between different creatures’ embryos (p. 42), but later admits 
that Haeckel’s famous drawings were doctored: “Instead of showing ac-
tual drawings from life, he used . . . some of the same illustrations to show 
embryos of organisms very different” (p. 221). To the charge by embry-
ologist Jonathan Wells that the embryos start out very different and only 
converge later before diverging again, Ruse responds that this “needs 
explaining and evolution is the only viable naturalistic explanation” (p. 
224). But since design has wrongly been excluded as supernaturalist, 
this is unconvincing. Ruse also cites vestigial organs. Some examples are 
controversial, e.g., it seems the appendix provides a reserve of “bacteria 
essential for digestion,” in case they are eliminated by cholera or dysen-
tery.2 But some are clear, e.g., the nubs of eyeless fish and salamanders. 
All these examples show, however, is the role of selection in removing 
useless function; they provide no evidence that selection can build eyes 
in the first place.
Ruse has a trump-card. Scientists have discovered a special set of 
genes—“Hox genes”— that account for the placement of body parts in 
bilaterians (organisms that are the same on both sides). These Hox genes 
make very similar proteins in frogs, fish, flies, mice and humans—surely 
a proof of common descent. But Dembski and Wells point out that de-
spite the similarities in genes, there are great differences in the organisms 
themselves: “Precisely because homeotic genes are universal they cannot 
explain the differences in organisms due to macroevolutionary change.”3
This takes us to the most important issue (discussed in chaps. 5 and 6), 
the argument that natural selection is the main cause of biological varia-
tion. As evidence, Ruse cites an impressive case of artificial selection (alco-
hol tolerance in fruitflies), Darwin’s finches, and rings of subspecies such 
as the greenish warbler complex. None of these examples shows how a 
new adaptation or body plan arises in the first place, so Ruse reverts to 
consilience. However, even Richard Dawkins admits the huge gaps be-
tween functional body plans: “living creatures are islands of viability 
1William A. Dembski and Jonathan Wells, The Design of Life (Dallas, TX: The 
Foundation for Thought and Ethics, 2008), p. 73.
2Barbara Miller, “Scientists discover true function of appendix organ,” avail-
able at: http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/10/10/2055374.htm 
3Dembski and Wells, The Design of Life, p. 49. 
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separated from other islands by gigantic oceans of grotesque deformity.”4 
How can one viable creature be gradually transformed into another, since 
most changes are lethal and any that are not cannot be coordinated by top-
down design? The best source of empirical data, human interaction with 
malaria, is not encouraging. As Michael Behe documents in The Edge of 
Evolution, most humans have achieved resistance to malaria by a mutation 
that deforms hemoglobin and which may lead to sickle-cell anemia, not 
by the development of a more sophisticated immune system. And there 
is increasing evidence from developmental biology that DNA mutation 
cannot explain macroevolution. For example, Newman and Müller argue 
that the organization of body plans cannot be explained purely by genes 
because “phenotypic outcomes persist despite extensive derangement in 
lines of ‘program code.’” They claim that “neo-Darwinism has no theory of 
the generative. As a consequence, current evolutionary theory can predict 
what will be maintained, but not what will appear.”5 Epigenetic factors—
factors outside of genes—are increasingly recognized as dominant in de-
velopment, and it is these that must change to produce new body plans.
Other chapters include recent speculations on the origin of life (chap. 3) 
and human evolution (chap. 7), and the impact of Darwinism on philoso-
phy (especially epistemology and ethics), literature and religion (chaps. 
10–12). And there are two admirably self-critical chapters on whether any 
of this is really true (chaps. 8 and 9). Ruse admits that some of the standard 
evidence for Darwinism is not as strong as some claim, but this, combined 
with his positive arguments, only makes his case more credible. Although 
this reviewer has indicated areas of skepticism, he is happy to recommend 
Ruse’s book as one of the strongest recent defenses of Darwinism.
4Richard Dawkins, The Ancestor’s Tale: A Pilgrimage to the Dawn of Evolution 
(New York: Mariner Books, 2005), p. 445.
5Gerd B. Müller and Stuart A. Newman, Origination of Organismal Form (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003 ), pp. 6–7. 
Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief, 
by John Bishop. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. Pp. 250, $65.00.
BRENDAN SWEETMAN, Rockhurst University
This book addresses “a core issue in the epistemology of religious belief,” 
the question of whether or not religious beliefs are epistemically justified, 
by attempting to progress beyond what the author regards as the current 
standoff between theists and atheists. Bishop takes seriously what he calls 
the “evidential ambiguity” that leaves open the question of God’s exis-
tence, and responds by offering us a meticulously developed, indeed in-
triguing, modest form of fideism, inspired by the views of William James. 
Although the argument of the book is detailed and quite technical (per-
haps unnecessarily so for what the book ultimately says), Bishop provides 
plenty of summary comment and a comprehensive glossary to aid readers 
